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We developed a model of pathogen dissemination in
the outpatient clinic that incorporates key kinetic aspects of
the transmission process, as well as uncertainty regarding
whether or not each incident patient is contagious.
Assigning appointments late in the day to patients suspect-
ed of being infectious should decrease pathogen dissemi-
nation.
P
athogen dissemination within hospitals has been exten-
sively analyzed (1). However, it has been the subject of
far fewer investigations within the outpatient clinic. We
developed a model of pathogen dissemination in the outpa-
tient clinic and explored the anticipated effects of a sys-
tem-based intervention (temporal segregation of suspected
infectious and noninfectious patients) and an individual-
based intervention (increased compliance with hand
hygiene) on the risk that an uncontaminated patient will
become contaminated during a clinic visit. An annotated
copy of the model, as well as more detailed simulations
and supporting material, may be obtained from the corre-
sponding author.
The Model
We treat pathogen dissemination as a stochastic
(chance-based) sequence of discrete encounters between
incident patients (P) who are either infectious or noninfec-
tious, a caregiver (C), and the environment (fomites, such
as surfaces or waiting room magazines, [E]), each of which
can be contaminated or uncontaminated. Four classes of
encounter exist: 1) caregiver-patient, 2) caregiver-environ-
ment, 3) patient-environment, and 4) patient-patient. For
each class of encounter, a user specifies a probability that
a contaminated or infectious participant can transmit the
pathogen to an uncontaminated participant (caregiver,
environment [fomites], and surrounding patients). A con-
taminated caregiver can, in turn, contaminate subsequent
patients (Figure 1). The contamination probabilities are not
predicated on a specific mode of transmission but repre-
sent the gross probability that a contaminated or infectious
participant will contaminate an uncontaminated participant
during an encounter. With the exception of patient-to-
patient transmission (see below) the contamination proba-
bilities can be asymmetrical. Asymmetrical contamination
probabilities allow consideration of droplet transmission;
e.g., an infectious patient could cough on a caregiver, who
then transfers the pathogen from his or her hands to the
next patient.
An infectious patient can also contaminate the 4
patients surrounding him or her in the clinic queue (2 pre-
ceding and 2 following patients). The model does not
incorporate patient-patient transmission by contaminated
patients, given the relatively low frequency of intimate
patient-to-patient physical contact in the clinic.
If contaminated, the caregiver may be decontaminated,
e.g., by hand hygiene or pathogen attrition, with a speci-
fied probability after each patient visit. Similarly, a speci-
fied probability exists that the environment, if
contaminated, will be decontaminated between visits.
These 2 decontamination processes (for the caregiver and
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Figure 1. Schematic of model and segregation. A) Depiction of first
3 patient encounters. P1, P2, and P3, patients 1, 2, and 3; C, care-
giver; E, environment. Arrows depict path (direction) of transmis-
sion if 1 participant in the interaction is infectious or contaminated.
P(hand hygiene), probability that a contaminated caregiver will
clear his or her contamination between patients; P(environ decon-
tam), probability that a contaminated environment will be effective-
ly decontaminated between patient visits. Direct patient-to-patient
transmission is shown by dashed arrows. Because the model
treats patient-to-patient transmission as a symmetrical process
(the probability of transmission from patient to patient is identical
regardless of which of the interacting patients is infectious),
dashed arrows have 2 heads. B) Effects of different scheduling
strategies. Solid circles, infectious high-risk patients; open circles,
noninfectious high-risk patients; solid squares, infectious low-risk
patients; open squares, noninfectious low-risk patients. Dots and
arrows leading to P4 and P5 represent continuation of the chain of
transmission. Ppc, probability of transmission from patient to care-
giver; Pcp, probability of transmission from caregiver to patient;
Pec, probability of transmission from environment to caregiver;
Pce, probability of transmission from caregiver to environment.;
Ppe, probability of transmission from patient to environment; Pep,
probability of transmission from environment to patient.the environment) are independent. Both the caregiver and
the environment can be recontaminated after decontamina-
tion. The contamination probabilities for transmission
from a contaminated environment to a patient or the care-
giver are fixed (i.e., not a function of the number of pre-
ceding infectious persons).
The model generates a random number for each class of
encounter between potentially contaminated or infectious
and uncontaminated participants during each clinic
appointment slot. If this random number is less than the
contamination probability specific to the class of interac-
tion being considered, the uncontaminated member
becomes contaminated during the encounter.
The user specifies the population prevalence of the
pathogen. A screening instrument for classifying patients
as high or low risk for being infectious is assumed to exist.
We assume that the screening instrument can be applied
before the patient’s clinic visit (at the time of appointment
scheduling). The screening instrument could comprise a
symptom inventory, knowledge of recent travel, household
exposure, membership in a known high-risk group, or a
combination of these or other elements. Such screening
instruments exist for methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus, vancomycin-resistant enterococci, and severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) (2–5). The postulated
instrument has a defined sensitivity and specificity; values
that can be combined with the population prevalence of
infectious patients to determine how many patients
deemed at high risk or low risk are actually contagious.
Incident patients are assigned to appointment times fol-
lowing 1 of 2 protocols. In the baseline protocol, patients
are randomly assigned appointments without regard to
their risk status. In the segregated protocol, patients at high
risk are assigned to appointments at the end of the clinic
day (Figure 1). Clinics that segregate high-risk patients to
later appointments might also adopt more stringent infec-
tion control strategies during the portion of the day popu-
lated by high-risk patients. Accordingly, the user can
specify values for each contamination probability that dif-
fer between low-risk (early in the day) and high-risk (late
in the day) clinic slots.
We modeled 1 day in a clinic in which 20 patients are
seen by 1 caregiver. The model predicts the likelihood
(risk) that a previously uncontaminated patient will
become contaminated during his or her clinic visit. The
model also predicts the risk that a patient who is classified
as high-risk based on the screening instrument, but who is
not infectious, will be contaminated in the segregated con-
figuration.
Figure 2 illustrates the effect of temporally segregating
patients deemed to be at high risk of being infectious to
clinic appointments late in the clinic schedule (panel A)
and the consequences of changes in caregiver hand-
hygiene compliance (panel B). Relevant pathogen-contam-
ination probabilities were arbitrarily fixed at 20%, a level
that is reasonable, and possibly conservative, for a wide
range of pathogens (Table 1) (6–14). Temporal segregation
substantially decreases the risk for pathogen dissemina-
tion, an effect that is at least comparable in magnitude to
that arising from changes in the likelihood of effective
hand hygiene within the clinically relevant range (15). 
Table 2 addresses the ethical concern of the increase in
contamination risk faced by noninfectious incident
patients who are classified as high risk, using the same sys-
tem inputs shown in Figure 2. The absolute risk for
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Figure 2. Risk that an uncontaminated patient will become con-
taminated during his or her clinic visit as a function of pathogen
prevalence in incident patients and clinic infection-control prac-
tices. A) Predicted effects of temporally segregating patients at
high risk of being infectious to appointments at the end of the clin-
ic day, using a screening instrument that is either 70% sensitive
and specific or 90% sensitive and specific. Transmission, hand
hygiene, and environmental decontamination probabilities are as
given in Table 1. B) Effects of varying levels of effective caregiver
hand hygiene (25%, 50%, or 75%) on pathogen dissemination. All
other inputs (probabilities of contamination) are identical to those
in A. Each data point represents the mean of 2,000 simulations of
a model day. An annotated copy of the model, as well as more
detailed simulations and supporting material, may be obtained
from the corresponding author.contamination faced by noninfectious but high-risk
patients increases at all levels of prevalence and screening
tool sensitivity and specificity; however, this increase does
not exceed 6% (in the setting of a completely ineffective
screening tool). More extensive analysis demonstrates that
selectively deploying more aggressive infection-control
practices to slots designated as high risk can lower the risk
faced by noninfectious but nominally high-risk patients to
below its value in the unsegregated configuration. These
data are available from the corresponding author.
Conclusions
The results do not address direct patient-to-patient
pathogen transmission; such transmission does not change
the qualitative predictions of the model. The model does
not incorporate either the potential for the environmental
pathogen load to increase over time or differences in host
susceptibility. The potential for cross-transmission of addi-
tional pathogens that have a higher prevalence in the high-
risk group is also not addressed. For example, a population
of patients deemed at high risk of having influenza or
SARS might also have a higher prevalence of other trans-
missible pathogens, such as Mycobacterium tuberculosis.
Improved hand hygiene, barrier precautions, patient use
of hand sanitizers or facemasks, and avoidance of environ-
mental fomites can each diminish dissemination risk.
However, these measures depend on individual behavior,
rendering them susceptible to implementation failure.
Temporal segregation adds a system-based layer of protec-
tion to such behavior-based interventions, providing an
additional barrier to pathogen dissemination that is not
critically dependent on individual compliance. When addi-
tional data addressing pathogen transmission within the
clinic become available (currently such data are sparse),
mathematical models could help guide the allocation of
resources required to support system-based infection-
control measures. Moreover, numerical experimentation
could help inform the design of infection-control strategies
for pathogens that have transmission dynamics that are not
yet well characterized.
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